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BOOK REVIEW
THE LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: A COLLECTION OF REVIEW
ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY. Edited by Hendrik
Hartog. New York: New York University, 1981, Pp. xiii, 264. $22.50.
DOYCE B. NUNIS, JR.*.
How does one review a book composed of law journal review essays
of some of the most important books relating to various facets of the law
prior, during, and immediately after the American Revolution? The pro-
blem becomes even more acute since the concluding essay, one of the
three original contributions in the book (the others being the introduc-
tion and one of the review essays), is really an overview of the essay
reviews! Thus one is confronted with an unseemly prospect-magpie
history, or should one say magpie reviews? Must one keep piling it on?
I think not. (I would hope that no one would write a review of this review.
That would be too much!)
Putting aside this obvious problem, this reviewer has decided not to
write a review essay of the review essays of the books which are re-
viewed in the review essays, or, as Gertrude Stein might have said, "a
review, of a review, of a review." Instead, this will be an impressionistic
summary of one historian's reading of the review essays themselves.
In his brief but pointed introduction, editor Hartog declares at the
outset: "It may be too soon to publish a collection of review essays in
American legal history."' Having read the book, I would agree. However,
Hartog rationalizes the point: We are told that the book "is not intended
to prove a mature and considered reflection on a completed corpus of
scholarship. Its purpose is to introduce historians and other non-legal
scholars to the kind of historiographical writing that is going on in
American law journals."2 Considering the number of law journals pub-
lished in this country, there is little question that few historians delve
into their pages. Thus, journal contents lie buried in myriad volumes care-
fully shelved in our wall-like library stacks. The intent of this volume
* B.A. 1947, The University of California at Los Angeles; M.S. 1950, M. Ed. 1952, Ph.
D. 1958, The University of Southern California. Professor of History, The University of
Southern California.
I THE LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW ix (H. Hartog
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION].
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is to open this untapped treasure trove to practicing historians (and I
assume practicing barristers, too).
Of the eight essays which constitute the book's contents, six have been
previously published -one in the University of Connecticut Law Review,3
one in the Indiana Law Journal,' and four in the New York University
Law Review. Only two of the essays are original - a book review essay
and an overview of the thrust of the collective contents. The sampling
is hardly widespread. It would appear that the real justification for inclu-
sion of the previously published essays, with what I deem to be one notable
exception, is that five of the reviews are concerned with books which
relate to the American Revolutionary era. The title of the book appears
to be an apt description of the contents (again, with one exception).
Six important books published within the last eight years are the focal
point of the review essays. Bruce H. Mann treats M.H. Smith's The Writs
of Assistance Case (1978); John Phillip Reid assays Bernard Bailyn's
magisterial work, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (1974); he also con-
tributes an original review of Garry Wills' controversial Inventing America
(1978) and Morton White's The Philosophy of the American Revolution
(1978); Robert W. Gordon examines William E. Nelson's The Americaniza-
tion of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts
Society, 1760-1830 (1975); Stephen B. Presser dissects Morton J. Horwitz'
The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977), while Hendrik Har-
tog and Peter R. Teachout evaluate John P. Reid's In a Defiant Stance:
The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, The Irish Comparison, and
the Coming of the American Revolution (1977). The concluding essay by
Hartog is a second original contribution.
The editor points out that because of the extraordinary number of law
journals, "[t]here is no shortage of space in the world of American law
review."' This is one of the explanations for the length of the book review
essays. A second justification given is perhaps more to the point: young
lawyers entering teaching ranks in law schools have not had the training
afforded other disciplines in respect to research and writing, for exam-
ple, a doctoral dissertation or another major scholarship effort. The void
' Mann, A Great Case Makes Law Not Revolution, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra
note 1, at 3-19 (reprinted from 11 U. CONN. L. REV. 353 (1979)).
' Hartog, Losing the World of the Massachusetts Whig, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
supra note 1, at 143-66 (reprinted from 54 IND. L.J. 65 (1978)).
' Reid, The Ordeal by Law of Thomas Hutchinson, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION. supra
note 1, at 20-45 (reprinted from 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 593 (1974)); Gordon, Accounting for Change
in American Legal History, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 93-112
(reprinted from 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 686 (1976)); Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition:
Towards a New American Legal History, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 1,
at 11342 (reprinted from 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700 (1977)); Teachout, Light in Ashes: The Pro-
blem of "Respect for the Rule of Law" in American Legal History, in LAW IN AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 167-225 (reprinted from 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 241 (1978)).
1 LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at xii.
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in training is filled by writing long book reviews. The justification: "A
long book review ... becomes a plausible and available way for a young
law teacher to organize his or her thinking about a subject and to prepare
for the substantive scholarship which surely must follow."' I am unable
to verify the latter assumption.
This explains, then, the length of the review essays and the fact that
each of them is footnoted, ranging in number from thirty-one (Gordon)
to 187 (Reid). However, as a practicing historian with a number of scholarly
publications to my credit, I have concluded that some of the footnotes
come close to padding. This padding once again raises the spectre of
magpie history.
Four elements dominate the book: legal events and change,
Massachusetts, the scholarship of John Reid, and the impact of Morton
Horwitz on American legal history. Legal events are the foci of Mann's
and Reid's reviews8, namely, the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case in Boston;
the ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, a native-born son of colonial
Massachusetts, in having to face the legal implications of colonial resistance
and revolt; and a new interpretation of the Declaration of Independence.
The history of writs of assistance is ably dealt with in Smith's The Writs
of Assistance Case. Bruce Mann's review is cogent, precise, and well struc-
tured. Suffice it to say that the chief protagonists were James Otis for
the defense and Thomas Hutchinson, chief justice of the superior court
in Massachusetts, for the Crown. Otis argued "that the writ of assistance
in England was special rather than general."9 That argument would mean
that in order to obtain a writ of assistance, literally a search warrant,
customs enforcement in each individual case would have to obtain the
necessary document from a local magistrate. The argument rejected the
premise that such writs could be provided by a blanket directive from
the Crown. Hutchinson contended that because writs of assistance in
England were indeed general, the model which had been used previously
in Massachusetts, although a variant, was legal. Otis lost; Hutchinson
triumphed. Mann concludes, and I am of like opinion, that "[a]s an
ideological issue, writs of assistance played only a small role in the op-
position to parliamentary sovereignty,"'" a view espoused by Bernard
Bailyn in his The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967).
The ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson begins with the Writs of Assistance
Case, which was the first major issue before him after he was appointed
chief justice of the superior court of Massachusetts in 1760. His "ordeal
by law,"" to quote Reid, commenced then and there and reached its climax
7 Id.
" Id. at 3-19, 20-45.
Mann, supra note 3, at 16.
Id. at 18.
" Reid, supra note 5, at 20.
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when he became acting governor in 1769 and was commissioned gover-
nor in 1771. His tenure lasted until 1774 when he was replaced by General
Thomas Gage. Hutchinson then sailed for England where he served as
an adviser to George III. He died at Brompton, now a part of London,
at age seventy-nine in 1780.
Bailyn's The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson is a classic study; Reid gives
it a classy review. 2 In two sentences, he pinpoints the reasons for Hut-
chinson's ordeal: "If Thomas Hutchinson was too legal, he was also too
law-minded. Everywhere he turned he was confronted by legal arguments,
and even when he resolved them he could be troubled.""3 As a final judg-
ment, Reid declares: "Thomas Hutchinson['s] . . . ordeal arose from the
fact that he was a dedicated, decent man-a good man for an impossible
task. The ordeal was compounded by his law-mindedness, which made
him a better man for the protection of [colonial] civil rights than for the
service of his king."'" That view is sustained by superior research on Reid's
part; his essay is supported by eighty-eight footnotes.
The same compliment can be doubly paid Reid in his hitherto unpub-
lished review of Garry Wills' Inventing America and Morton White's The
Philosophy of the American Revolution. The narrative exposition is sus-
tained by 187 footnotes! One must remember, however, that Professor
Reid has been researching the American Revolutionary era for some time. 5
Reid's review essay is aptly entitled "The Irrelevance of the
Declaration."" Ten arguments are used to dismiss the influence of natural
law on the framing of the Declaration of Independence, while the dispell-
ing of the aura of myth concerning the influence of John Locke is equally
telling. White's book is dismissed as "almost a caricature of the genre
of Declaration scholarship"'7 which Reid has critiqued so superbly. Reid
concurs with Wills' view: "ITihe Declaration's purpose was to lay the legal
foundation for an alliance with France."'8 Further, the Declaration and
its preamble were "not regarded as important during the Revolution." 9
Moreover, "the Declaration was not, and was never intended to be, either
a statement of philosophy or political theory."20
One might ask: What was it then? Reid would respond: American col-
onials (he uses the word "Whig") "knew about constitutional law .... They
thought constitutional law not a myth and were at least familiar enough
12 Id. at 20-45.
," Id. at 35 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 45.
" See, e.g., J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE (1977).
6 Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note
1, at 46-89.
" Id. at 78.





with the ancient English constitution so that, when they read the Declara-
tion of Independence, they did not think of natural law, John Locke, or
Scots philosophy. They recognized constitutional principles relevant to
their cause."'"
Robert W. Gordon gives us a straightforward review of William Nelson's
The Americanization of the Common Law.' In that volume, Nelson
surveyed seventy years of Massachusetts law, 1760-1830. Nelson sought
"to relate legal change to 'more basic changes in American thought and
society.' "" In the end, Gordon concludes that it is a "more problematic
enterprise, one requiring both much more monographic work on small-
scale problems and more sophisticated social theories of law than the field
has yet produced."2' It does succeed on one point: It "exposes very clearly
the weaknesses of the mechanical linkages between legal rules and social
behavior."
It appears that Nelson "rigidifies the structure of social change. '28 He
is prone to draw rigid dichotomies between various elements, for exam-
ple, "between ethical unity and ethical relativism." There are like ex-
amples. The result is that when Nelson begins to feed his evidence through
the categories, difficulties appear immediately. The most important is that
it "causes him to miss subtleties of interpretation."'
Morton J. Horwitz' The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 is
brilliantly analyzed by Stephen B. Presser.' This book, however, has on-
ly a marginal relationship to the American Revolutionary era. Its strength,
indeed its thrust, is solidly post-Revolution. It is puzzling why it was in-
cluded. One could argue that it does emphasize a revolution in our previous
understanding of the law, thus it qualifies. Certainly, the book is a major
revisionist view of early American legal history.
The heart of Horwitz' thesis is that after 1790 the law was gradually
transformed to favor economic growth and development. Instead of cir-
cumscribing economic competition as the law had in the past, the courts
actually stimulated competition. As a result an alliance was struck be-
tween the rising merchant class and the legal profession which proved
beneficial to both. Together they grew in power and wealth.
Horwitz clearly demonstrates that "diverse forces -moral, political, and
economic--go into making the law, and ... that the law does not develop
along strictly logical lines."' This view is ably supported by Horwitz' ex-
SId. at 89.




2 Id. at 96.
" Id. at 97.
25 Id. at 102.




position of various modes of judicial analysis, inquiry into "judges' intellec-
tual processes in order to explain the inconsistencies of their decisions,"'"
and his description of "substantive legal doctrines."32
Professor Presser offers some illuminating challenges to the Horwitzian
view. He believes that the book alone "is not enough to support a move-
ment for radical legal reform."' Simply put, "the weak and relatively
powerless segments of American society were legally overwhelmed by
nineteenth-century anti-democratic judges."" Horwitz "tells us relatively
little about the effects of legislative action, although [he] occasionally hints
that state legislatures were pressured into passing legislation antithetical
to commercial interests."3 5 Moreover, if it is true that merchants and en-
trepreneurs profited, "it does not necessarily follow that these gains came
at the expense of other groups such as farmers and consumers."3 Fur-
thermore, it may be anachronistic to apply twentieth century social
classifications to nineteenth century realities. But there is no question:
Horwitz has effectively demonstrated that "the development of American
law reflects a continuing struggle between competing economic and social
interests."'37
In a carefully crafted review, Hendrik Hartog discusses John Reid's
In a Defiant Stance: The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish
Comparison, and the Coming of the American Revolution.' The book's
thesis is "that the legal context of the American Revolution was shaped
by the unequal conflict between two competing conceptions of law: a Whig
[colonial] law of local institutions and an imperial law of parliament and
of the provincial agents of the Crown."'39 Again, Massachusetts is the
centerpiece. From the colonial view, "the Whig theory of law was grounded
both in a perception of the autonomy of local legal institutions as indepen-
dent recipients of constitutional power and authority, and in a realistic
appreciation of the relative ineffectuality of all governmental institutions
whether local or central.""0
Pointedly, Hartog declares that In a Defiant Stance is without ques-
tion a "neo-Whig" book, influenced by the scholarship of Bailyn and others.
That view can best be described as follows: "[T]he actions of the revolu-
tionaries were rooted in a consistent and long-lived world view which
justified their belief in the corruption and the conspiratorial designs of
" Id. at 128.
32 Id.





Hartog, supra note 4.
Id. at 147.
40 Id. at 152.
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the leaders of the British empire."' Whigs were serious in their beliefs;
their beliefs must therefore be taken seriously. One must believe what
they said about themselves and their ideologies. In a Defiant Stance does
just that. In so doing, it "is in the first instance a discussion of how the
revolutionaries got away with it, a discussion of the legal technology of
rebellion in Massachusetts Bay:"'2 The comparison with Ireland merely
reinforces rather than detracts from the American view, but it becomes
abundantly clear why Ireland was different from America.
Peter R. Teachout looks at In a Defiant Stance in a different context. 3
He looks at it through humanistic glasses. He holds that Reid set "out
to compare 'the conditions of law' in the American colonies during the
years leading up to the Revolution with those in Ireland during roughly
the same period."" Theoretically governed by the same common law and
imperial administration, the conditions of law in these two British posses-
sions were highly divergent. Poor Ireland had no rule of law, only a rule
of men; America had a rule of law to which all men were bound.
In a lengthy exposition (actually the longest review essay in the book,
fifty-eight pages), documented by 149 footnotes (second only to Reid's treat-
ment of Wills and White), Professor Teachout comes to a critical and
restrained judgment, in sharp contrast to that of Professor Hartog.
Teachout believes Reid's book is curious and contradictory, although "the
insights it provides into law in the American colonies during the revolu-
tionary period are potentially profound; and yet somehow the most im-
portant of these seem to be left pressing at the surface, never quite fully
realized." ' s
The point of departure between Teachout and Reid appears to be over
the difference between law in Ireland and America. Reid holds that it
was "'not ... in the substance of the law' but in respect for the rule of
law itself."'6 Teachout demurs strongly: "We resist this conclusion-this
dichotomy between 'substance' and 'rule'-partly because we know it does
not faithfully reflect the colonists' own experience, but more importantly,
because it runs against the grain of everything we know about the rule
of law in history."'7 The argument has yet to be resolved.
It falls to Professor Hartog to try to bring the divergent strands of
this book of collected review essays together in an original summary essay,
"Distancing Oneself from the Eighteenth .Century: A Commentary on
, Id. at 154.
Id. at 157 (emphasis in original).
, Teachout, supra note 5.
" Id. at 176 (footnotes omitted).
,5 Id. at 225.
, Id. at 222 (emphasis in original).
4: Id.
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Changing Pictures of Americal Legal History."48 In doing so, he strikes
out critically against Teachout's views of the works of Horwitz and Reid.
I found myself in strong sympathy with the criticisms voiced. It appears
to me that Teachout is excessively either/or. Historical truth is rarely
so easily categorized. There are too many shades and colors, too many
refractions from too many participants. And there is an awful lot of gray.
Much remains in the shadows.
What Professor Hartog argues in concluding this book is that there
presently appears to be a dichotomous history of American law. However,
if one looks closely and reads carefully, what one discovers is really a
new legal history. It is not so new that it does not have historical
antecedents; it is firmly rooted in the writings of Roscoe Pound. This
new legal history includes historians Horwitz, Nelson, and Reid. These
three "are simply reviving the 'formative era' thesis championed by Roscoe
Pound,"49 but with a sharp difference: the periodization and the questions
posed are markedly different. The new school's view "is shaped not by
the contrast between law and no law, but rather by the contrast between
law at one time and law at another."" Nor are these new legal historians
interested in the questions of how the common law was received. Rather,
they "share a common perception of the legal world of the eighteenth
century as both a strange and unfamiliar place, yet also as the product
of a demonstrably 'legal' culture."-"
Hartog closes by detailing what the new school has not told us, and
that litany is impressive. Through his model of discontinuity utilized
through his closing essay, Professor Hartog recognizes that it "remains
a largely empty construct."52 It is only through the study of history and
law together that we may yet arrive at a genuine understanding of the
culture of eighteenth century American law. We have not yet reached
that understanding. But there is a beginning in the books reviewed and
the review essays encompassed in this work on The Law in the American
Revolution and the Revolution in the Law. Perhaps there is something
valuable in magpie history after all. At least it can help build a nest.
8 Hartog, Distancing Oneself from the Eighteenth Century: A Commentary on Changing
Pictures of American Legal History, in LAW IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION. supra note 1, at 229-57.
, Id. at 243.
Id. at 248.
5' Id. at 250.
Id. at 256.
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